Politicians Steer definite of Tax Will improve Round Elections
Andrew C. Chang, Linda R. Cohen, Amihai Glazer, and Urbashee Paul
We insist recent annual info on gasoline taxes and corporate earnings taxes from U.S. states to examine whether or no longer politicians steer definite of tax will improve in election years. These info comprise 3 well-known attributes: (1) when state politicians make tax laws, (2) when state politicians implement tax laws on customers and companies, and (3) the dimension of tax adjustments. Utilizing a pre-prognosis analysis conception that suggestions regressions of tax rate adjustments and tax enactment years on time-to-gubernatorial election 365 days indicators, we uncover that elections lower the probability of politicians enacting will improve in taxes and sever again the dimension of applied tax adjustments relative to non-election years. We uncover some proof that politicians are most likely to make tax will improve appropriate after an election. These election outcomes are stronger for gasoline taxes than for corporate earnings taxes and depend on no diversified political, demographic, or macroeconomic prerequisites. Supplemental prognosis supports political salience over legislative e ort in producing this distinction in electoral outcomes.
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January 29, 2021